Charles Clarke

Westminster pundits generally agree that David Cameron has so far failed to 'seal the deal' with the British electorate.

The reason for this is pretty clear: Cameron has used his three and a half years as Tory Leader to send messages about a change in Tory tone, to try and 'detoxify the Tory brand' and to float lightly about the political landscape trying to take advantage of particular Government embarrassments or failures.  He has sometimes done these things very skilfully.

But throughout there has been little substance or sense of certainty about the future.

The contrast with Labour in opposition in the 1980s is instructive. Through many difficult contests (the rosy view that Labour did not have division then is quite wrong) Neil Kinnock's leadership addressed Labour's problems of policy, organisation and communication.

Communication and organisation provided some of the best theatre. Adoption of the red rose and the contest with Militant provided plenty of headlines.

But the meat was in the arguments about policy - withdrawal from the European Union, sales of council houses, re-nationalisation of utilities, industrial relations law, unilateral nuclear disarmament and a range of other questions. These were bruising disputes about genuinely held differences of opinion but they had to happen because Labour had to show that we were equipped to govern in tune with the feelings of the nation. In the end we did not go far enough, particularly on tax and spending, so that the famous 1992 'Shadow Budget' illustrated the limitations of our changes and left us open to attacks on our credibility. These doubts were enough to lead to defeat and five more crippling Tory years.

David Cameron has engaged on none of the big Tory policy problems, either with his own Party or with the country as a whole. He believes that he can get to, and then win, a General Election, without addressing those issues. He hopes that the mood for change - any change - will be so strong that people (the media in particular) will be uninterested in Conservative policies. His dream is to be elected with a 'doctor's mandate' giving him policy freedom after a General Election without the need to commit beforehand.

In this hope he takes false strength from the example of Tony Blair, who he believes went to the 1997 General Election 'policy-lite' and surfed the wave of public opinion desperate for an end to the Tory government without making difficult commitments.

There are two errors in this thinking. The first is that Labour, under Neil Kinnock's leadership, had already done most of the heavy policy lifting, so that Tony Blair didn't need to do it. In contrast none of David Cameron's predecessors, William Hague, Ian Duncan-Smith or Michael Howard did any of that. Indeed in many ways they went in the opposite direction and dug the Tories deeper into their reactionary and nationalistic bunker. They left the hard work to David Cameron but it's been too difficult for him.

David Cameron's second mistake is equally important. Tony Blair did construct a policy alternative to the Conservatives and in some detail. The clearest expression of that was the '5 Pledges' on the card. These were deceptively simple. In fact they were more than symbolic and they were difficult to achieve. They charted a clear direction for New Labour.

I believe that the reason Cameron's poll ratings contrast so poorly with Blair's in 1996 is that Cameron still has to make the substantial decisions on policy direction which would enable him to convince the public that he's the right man to lead the country.

And of course that failure gives Labour its chance and shows the strategy which we have to follow.

In three key areas we have to be clear about our approach and to press the Conservatives aggressively.

The first of these is the management of the economy and public spending.

The world financial and economic crisis means that any British government has to set out the way in which it will restore our fiscal strength. Any government will have both to raise taxation and to reduce spending.

That debate will dominate politics for the next five years, as we discuss what taxes to raise and which spending to cut. Labour must force the Conservatives to set their approach, and so reveal the deep Tory divisions about both tax and spending.

So far we have not been able to challenge effectively. A major reason for this is that our own Budget on April 22nd did not go far enough in showing how Labour would resolve these matters. The 50p top rate of tax and the commitment to £15billion of efficiency savings were not enough to set out our own approach clearly. We need to highlight our own commitment to social justice and more efficient public services and so expose Tory prevarications.

Our second focus should be upon the Tory approach to the European Union, and indeed international affairs in general. The split between the Tory Party and the European Peoples' Party has been fairly well advertised, but the implications less so.

The British people have concerns about the economy, about crime, about dealing with migration effectively, about addressing climate change and energy security, and about building peace and security.

All of these matters can only be addressed internationally, and in particular at the level of the European Union.

None of them can be solved by retreating behind the White Cliffs of Dover, erecting ever higher barriers between ourselves and our neighbours and hoping that ill winds will just blow past us.

The fact is that the introverted, negative and reactionary nationalism offered by David Cameron's Conservative Party would leave our citizens adrift as the international pressures we face become greater and greater. 'Stop the World I want to get off' is an aspiration which is simply no answer to the very real challenges of the modern world.

As with tax and spend, it is essential for Labour to set out clearly our own approach to the best means of international co-operation, both inside and outside the European Union, to address these challenges, and then to force the Conservative to outline their approach. On the basis of their current policies this is frankly incredible and could only advertise their deep internal divisions.

Unfortunately the state of our domestic politics has made it difficult to set out these alternatives during the European Parliament election campaign, as would have been desirable. However over a difficult autumn for the European Union we can and should continue to press our stance energetically.

The third key policy area is the relationship between security and civil liberties. This is another major internal Tory rift as David Davis has illustrated. In recent years the Tory approach has been cynical and oppositionist. Whether on counter-terrorism or identity cards, on anti-social behaviour or the introduction of politics into policing, the Tory 'civil libertarians' have won their internal argument, to the extent that the Tories cannot be trusted with Government.

In this area senior Conservatives do understand their own contradictions as they aspire to Government but they just hope that they can avoid debate. Here too Labour has to continue with clear policy proposals and to engage the debate.

David Cameron's ability to 'seal the deal' and secure a Conservative election victory depends on Labour's clarity in setting out our own policy agenda. On that basis we must force our opponents onto the battlefield.

The people we represent rely upon our success.

Charles Clarke MP